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Abstract		
	
In	 recent	 years,	 Swedish	 accounting	 has	 undergone	 major	 changes,	 particularly	
regarding	 the	K3	regulatory	 framework.	Bigger	companies	whose	 financial	year	began	
after	December	31,	2013	have	 to	comply	with	K3,	however,	K3	compliance	 is	optional	
for	smaller	companies	who	could	instead	choose	to	comply	with	K2.	We	have	discovered	
some	 companies	 in	 the	 trade	 industry	 do	 not	 include	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 lease	
disclosures,	which	is,	compared	to	previous	regulations,	a	new	requirement	for	K3.		
	
The	 purpose	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 to	 not	 only	 investigate	 to	 what	 extent	 K3	 compliant	
companies	 include	rent	 for	premises	 in	the	disclosure	of	 leases,	but	also	to	 investigate	
underlying	 factors	 as	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 rent	 for	 premises	 is	 included	 in	 the	 lease	
disclosures.	
	
We	have,	based	on	two	existing	theories	and	previous	research,	formed	hypotheses	that	
we	have	tested	in	order	to	find	explanations	for	the	companies’	accounting	choices	and	
lack	of	disclosure	 regarding	 the	 rent	 for	premises.	Previous	 research	has	mostly	dealt	
with	earlier	standards	 in	Sweden	and	the	IFRS.	However,	we	focused	on	the	K3	in	our	
study	 using	 a	 quantitative	 method	 based	 on	 company	 annual	 reports	 from	 2014.	 It	
turned	 out	 that	 56	 of	 our	 total	 sample	 of	 178	 companies	 did	 not	 include	 rent	 for	
premises	in	the	disclosure	for	leases.	
	
We	 conducted	 a	 regression	 analysis	which	 shows	 that	 the	 agency	 theory,	 stakeholder	
perspective	 and	 previous	 research	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 information	 and	
audit	firms	can	explain	the	omission	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.		
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1. Introduction 
	
1.1 Background  
	
Recently,	 the	 regulation	 of	 Swedish	 accounting	has	 undergone	major	 changes.	A	 large	
part	of	the	changes	are	The	Swedish	Accounting	Standards	Boards	(BFN).	The	K‐project	
whose	 aim	 is	 to	 simplify	 the	 process	 of	 accounting	 by	 establishing	 standardized	
regulations	 for	 each	 type	 of	 businesses	 instead	 of	 one	 regulation	 for	 each	 accounting	
issue.	This	was	done	by	dividing	the	companies	into	four	groups:	K1,	K2,	K3	and	K4	and	
the	respective	category	will	 include	all	rules	relevant	to	the	group	(Drefeldt	&	Törning	
2012).	From	the	financial	year	2014	companies	had	to	decide	which	of	the	K	regulations	
they	 wanted	 to	 comply	 with.	 Bigger	 companies	 whose	 financial	 year	 began	 after	
December	 31,	 2013	 had	 to	 comply	 with	 K3,	 but	 for	 smaller	 companies	 it	 was	 only	
optional	 and	 could	 instead	 comply	 with	 K2.	 	 This	 means	 that	 as	 this	 thesis	 is	 being	
written,	 in	 2015	 ‐	 the	 companies	 that	 fall	 into	 category	 K3	 have	 recently	 started	 to	
comply	with	 this	 regulation	 in	 their	 accounting	 (BFN	 2013).	 K3	 constitutes	 the	main	
legal	 framework	 and	 is	 partly	 based	 on	 the	 international	 regulations	 IFRS	 for	 SMEs,	
which	International	Accounting	Standard	Board	(IASB)	issued	for	non‐listed	companies	
and	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 simplified	 version	 of	 International	 financial	 Reporting	
Standards	 (IFRS).	 Since	 accounting	 in	 Sweden	 has	 a	 strong	 connection	with	 taxation,	
adjustments	have	been	made	to	tax	regulations	and	The	Swedish	Annual	Accounts	Act	
(ÅRL)	(Drefeldt	&	Törning	2012).	
	
As	 K3	 is	 principle‐based	 it	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 to	 interpret	 its	 content,	 which	
should	 reasonably	 raise	 the	 question	 if	 Swedish	 companies	 are	 complying	 with	 the	
regulation	in	a	consistent	way.	Similar	problems	have	been	encountered	in	attempts	to	
harmonize	 the	 accounting	 of	 Europe	 member	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	
comparability	 and	 transparency	 of	 crossborder	 financial	 statements.	 As	 part	 of	 the	
harmonization	process,	The	European	Parliament	made	the	decision	that	from	2005	all	
listed	 companies	 have	 to	 consolidate	 account	 statements	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
provisions	of	the	IFRS	and	International	Accounting	Standard	(IAS)	(Marton	et	al.	2012).	
This	 type	of	harmonization	 is	 called	 "De	 jure"	or	also	Formal	Harmonization	 in	which	
the	 goal	 is	 to	 obtain	 harmonization	 through	 regulation.	 The	 second	 type	 of	
harmonization	"de	facto",	also	called	Substantive	Harmonization,	creates	harmonization	
through	the	consistent	practice	of	accounting	among	companies.	Even	if	the	expectation	
is	for	the	formal	harmonization	to	lead	to	substantive	harmonization,	the	relationship	is	
not	 entirely	 clear.	 Formal	 harmonization	 may	 even	 lead	 to	 negative	 effects	 on	
harmonization	by	accounting	choices	and	interpretations	of	the	regulations	(Canibano	&	
Mora,	2000).	Furthermore,	prior	research	found	that	considerable	differences	between	
the	 countries’	 institutions,	 such	 as	 laws,	 audit	 and	 supervision	 counteract	 the	 process	
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for	uniform	accounting	by	IFRS	endeavors.	It	has	been	established	that	institutions	have	
an	 affect	 that	 makes	 companies	 disregard	 international	 accounting	 standards	 for	 the	
benefit	of	institutional	laws	(Wysocki,	2011).	Therefore,	formal	harmonization	does	not	
lead	to	substantive	harmonization	under	these	kinds	of	conditions.		
	
Since	the	relationship	between	formal	harmonization	and	substantive	harmonization	is	
not	 as	 strong	 in	 some	 cases,	 it	 is	 a	 legitimate	 question	 to	 ask	 whether	 the	 Swedish	
financial	statements	are	consistent	among	the	domestic	companies.	
	
The	relatively	new	K‐regulation	from	2014	is	mandatory	for	bigger	companies	and	can	
mean	 major	 changes	 for	 companies	 that	 previously	 applied	 different	 standards.	 For	
instance,	 changes	 have	 been	made	 regarding	 new	disclosure	 requirements	 for	 leasing	
which	now	include	rent	for	premises	(Far	Academy	2014).		
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
	
BFN,	 according	 to	 The	 Swedish	 Book‐keeping	 Act	 (BFL),	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	
development	 of	 Swedish	 Generally	 Accepted	 Accounting	 Principles	 (Swedish	 GAAP),	
which	 in	 other	 words	 means	 that	 if	 a	 company	 follows	 the	 advice	 and	 guidelines	
presented	 by	 BFN,	 it	 also	 automatically	 follows	 the	 Swedish	 GAAP.	 However,	 if	 one	
deviated	from	BFN,	it	would	consequently	be	an	act	of	breaking	the	law	(BFN	2015).		
What	is	defined	as	Swedish	GAAP	can	be	interpreted	from	the	preparatory	works	to	BFL,	
which	 defines	 it	 as	 accounting	 practice;	what	 companies	 actually	 do.	 Problems	would	
arise	if	 it	turned	out	that	companies	actually	did	not	follow	the	guidelines	provided	by	
BFN,	which	would	consequently	mean	that	these	companies	had	been	breaking	the	law	
(Albanson	 &	 Törning	 2015).	 Alternatively,	 one	 can	 also	 argue	 that	 if	 the	 guidelines	
provided	 by	 BFN	 do	 not	 reflect	 business	 practices	 then	 instead	 of	 the	 companies	
adapting	to	the	regulations,	the	regulations	should	adapt	to	the	current	practice.		
The	purpose	of	the	mandatory	disclosures	is	to	streamline	the	economy	by	reducing	the	
information	 asymmetry	 between	 management	 and	 the	 company's	 stakeholders.	 This	
will	 consequently	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 capital	 market	 and	 tax	 system.	
Disclosure	 contributes	 in	other	words	 that	 the	purpose	of	 accounting	 is	 achieved,	 and	
therefore	 it	 is	 important	 for	 companies	 to	provide	 the	 right	 information	 in	 the	annual	
report	 Furthermore,	 inconsistent	 accounting	 creates	 problems	 for	 users	 to	 compare	
financial	 statements	 between	 companies,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 same	branch	 of	 industry	
(Marton	2013).	
	
Previous	research	on	accounting	choices	for	disclosures	have	been	made	by	Amiraslani	
et	 al.	 (2013)	 which	 indicates	 shortcomings	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	 disclosure	
requirements	of	listed	companies	applying	IFRS.	Amiraslani	et	al.	(2013)	investigated	in	
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this	 case	 disclosures	 regarding	 IAS	 36,	 Impairment	 of	 Assets	 and	 found	 that	 the	
information	 provided	 by	 companies	 that	 requires	 management	 involvement	 tends	 to	
have	 flaws.	 Another	 study	 made	 by	 Verriest	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 found	 that	 corporate	
governance	was	a	factor	that	determined	the	quality	of	the	information.	They	identified	
that	 companies	 that	 have	 strong	 corporate	 governance	 tend	 to	 achieve	 the	 disclosure	
requirements	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 compared	with	 companies	 that	 had	weak	 corporate	
governance.	
Unlike	these	studies,	which	are	limited	to	IFRS	and	larger	listed	companies,	we	want	to	
examine	 compliance	with	disclosure	 requirements	 and	which	 factors	 affect	 deviations	
from	 the	 requirements	 in	 the	 Swedish	 context.	 Since	 K3	 as	 from	 2014	 become	
mandatory	and	involves	changes	in	disclosure	requirements	for	leasing,	we	will	examine	
this	disclosure	 in	 the	companies	 that	apply	K3	 in	order	 to	 find	out	 to	what	extent	 the	
requirements	are	met	and	what	affects	any	eventual	deviation.		
1.3 Research Questions  
	
From	the	problem	discussion	two	research	questions	were	defined:	
	
		"To	what	extent	do	companies	that	apply	K3	include	rent	for	premises	in	the	
disclosures	for	leases?”		
	
“What	factors	could	be	behind	whether	or	not	rent	for	premises	is	included	in	the	
disclosure	of	leases?”	
	
1.4 Purpose 
	
The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	to	what	extent	companies	who	comply	with	K3	
achieve	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 leasing	 disclosure.	 Furthermore	 we	 will	 create	
hypotheses	 of	 possible	 factors	 that	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 disclosure	
requirements	 are	 met.	 Based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	 data	 a	 possible	 pattern	 will	 be	
identified	in	order	to	understand	the	phenomena.	
 
1.5 Outline 
	
Chapter	2:	Theoretical	Framework	
This	 chapter	will	begin	with	describing	disclosures	 in	general:	mandatory	disclosures,	
criticism	of	 disclosures,	 and	 disclosure	 requirements	 in	K3	 and	 prior	 regulations.	The	
chapter	 continues	 with	 presenting	 the	 selected	 theories,	 previous	 research	 and	 our	
hypotheses.	
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Chapter	3:	Method	
In	 the	 method	 chapter,	 we	 will	 present	 the	 method	 of	 this	 thesis	 and	 the	 research	
approach	 we	 have	 chosen	 to	 use.	 In	 this	 chapter	 we	 also	 present	 the	 selection	 of	
information	channel,	data	acquisition	and	the	databases	we	used.	This	is	followed	by	an	
operationalization	of	the	data	where	the	dependent	variable	along	with	the	independent	
variables	are	presented.	
	
Chapter	4:	Empirical	Results	and	Analysis	
In	this	chapter	we	firstly	present	 the	result	 from	our	quantitative	research,	which	will	
answer	 how	 many	 companies	 have	 and	 have	 not	 included	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	
disclosures	 of	 leases.	 Then	 follows	 descriptive	 statistics,	 which	 will	 show	 the	 basic	
features	 of	 the	 data	 collected	 in	 this	 study.	 In	 order	 to	 establish	 whether	 or	 not	 the	
independent	variables	correlate	with	each	other	a	bivariate	correlation	analysis	will	be	
presented	 and	 discussed.	 Lastly,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 study’s	 analysis	 a	 binary	 regression	
analysis	 will	 interpret	 the	 data	 collected	 and	 answer	 if	 the	 hypotheses	 can	 correctly	
explain	the	variation	of	the	dependent	variable.	
	
Chapter	5:	Conclusions,	Discussions	and	Further	Research	
This	chapter	will	present	the	conclusions	that	we	have	drawn	and	a	discussion	will	take	
place	around	them.	Finally,	a	suggestion	for	future	research	will	be	provided.	
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2. Theoretical Framework 
	
This	 chapter	 will	 begin	 with	 describing	 disclosures	 in	 general:	 mandatory	 disclosures,	
criticism	 of	 disclosures,	 and	 disclosure	 requirements	 in	 K3	 and	 prior	 regulations.	 The	
chapter	 continues	by	presenting	previous	 research	and	 selected	 theories	 from	which	we	
create	our	hypotheses.	Two	of	the	hypotheses	are	partially	created	from	theories:	the	agent	
theory	and	 the	 theory	of	 the	 stakeholder	perspective,	whereas	 the	rest	of	 the	hypotheses	
are	created	from	previous	research.	Lastly,	the	hypotheses	are	summarized	and	illustrated	
in	a	figure	in	order	to	get	an	overview	of	the	theoretical	framework.		
	
2.1 Disclosures in General 
	
Marton	(2013)	defines	disclosures	as	additional	information	that	is	outside	the	balance	
sheet	and	income	statements	but	are	 linked	to	them.	By	explaining	and	presenting	the	
assessments	 that	 have	 been	 made,	 the	 user	 of	 the	 financial	 reports	 is	 given	 the	
opportunity	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 management	 have	 made	 reasonable	
judgments.	Another	function	of	the	disclosures	is	to	provide	detailed	information	of	the	
items	on	 the	balance	 sheet	and	 income	statement	which	otherwise	would	 take	up	 too	
much	 space.	 In	 order	 to	 rightfully	 describe	 the	 company’s	 finances,	 larger	 and	 listed	
companies	with	complex	economic	structures	must	disclose	more	 information	 in	 their	
financial	reports.			
	
2.2 Mandatory Disclosures  
 
The	 purpose	 of	 the	 mandatory	 disclosures	 is	 to	 fulfill	 what	 traditional	 accounting	
intends	 to	 do:	 reducing	 the	 information	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 company's	
management	 and	 its	 stakeholders.	 To	 accomplish	 this	 task,	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	merely	
using	a	balance	sheet	and	 income	statement	and	 implementing	mandatory	disclosures	
will	 hopefully	 lead	 to	 more	 efficient	 capital	 markets	 and	 tax	 systems.	 In	 addition	 to	
financial	 objectives	 and	 stakeholders’	 needs	 for	 information,	 there	 may	 be	 political	
objectives	 with	 mandatory	 disclosures	 such	 as	 gender	 equality	 and	 environmental	
issues.	In	Sweden	there	is	a	requirement	to	disclose	the	gender	balance	of	staff,	and	the	
idea	is	that	by	supplying	information,	companies	also	actively	work	to	maintain	a	gender	
balance	in	the	workplace	(Marton	2013).	
	
A	study	done	by	Glaum	et	al.	(2012)	examined	the	compliance	of	mandatory	disclosures	
of	 European	 companies	 that	 followed	 IFRS	 and	 found	 that	 there	was	 significant	 non‐
compliance.	 The	 study	 focused	 on	 IFRS	 3:	 Business	 Combinations	 and	 IAS	 36	
Impairment	 of	 Assets	 and	 from	 the	 results	 they	 identified	 that	 the	 compliance	 was	
determined	by	 company	 and	 country‐specific	 factors.	 Factors	 on	 a	 country	 level	were	
identified	as	 the	strength	of	 the	enforcement	system	and	the	size	of	 the	national	stock	
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market.	 Lastly,	 the	 factors	 on	 the	 company	 level	 were	 as	 follows:	 the	 importance	 of	
goodwill	 positions,	 prior	 experience	with	 IFRS,	 type	 of	 auditor,	 the	 existence	 of	 audit	
committees,	 the	 issuance	 of	 equity	 shares	 or	 bonds	 in	 the	 reporting	 period	 or	 in	 the	
subsequent	period,	ownership	structure	and	industry.	
	
2.3 Criticism of Disclosures 
	
In	 previous	 studies	 it	 has	 been	 concluded	 that	 information	 is	 costly	 to	 the	 individual	
company	 but	 favorable	 for	 the	 economy	 at	 large.	 There	 is	 a	 demand	 from	 external	
stakeholders,	particularly	shareholders,	 to	reduce	the	 information	asymmetry	and	it	 is	
the	 task	of	accounting	 to	 reduce	and	manage	 this	 (Marton	2013).	 Ijiri	 (1983)	explains	
that	the	principle	of	information	that	flows	between	the	accountor	and	the	accountee	is	
not	 as	 simple	 as	 total	 transparency	 and	 lack	 of	 information	 asymmetry;	 instead	 there	
are	other	aspects	that	must	be	taken	into	account.	Disclosure	of	mandatory	information	
is	not	just	for	the	accountee,	but	is	also	a	protection	for	the	accountor	that	indicates	the	
limit	 of	 how	much	 information	 one	 has	 to	 disclose	 in	 the	 financial	 statements.	 If	 the	
financial	statements	include	all	the	information,	there	will	be	a	risk	that	this	could	harm	
the	 company,	 such	 as	 competitive	 disadvantages	 and	 trade	 secrets	 that	 would	 be	
revealed.	In	addition	to	the	information	itself,	the	process	of	producing	the	information	
constitutes	 harm	 to	 the	 company	 through	monetary	 costs	 and	 opportunity	 costs.	 The	
process	 of	 finding	 information	 and	 having	 them	 audited	 represents	 costs	 in	 both	
monetary	form	and	in	time	which	could	have	been	used	in	operational	projects.	Much	of	
the	 criticism	 that	 has	 been	 directed	 towards	 IASB	 by	 companies	 is	 that	 they	 require	
information	from	companies	without	taking	into	account	if	the	cost	exceeds	the	benefit,	
or	if	all	information	that	is	required	is	in	fact	material	(Marton	2013).	
	
Some	 companies	 disclose	 information	 even	 though	 it	 may	 entail	 costs	 as	 described	
above	 and	 according	 to	 Skinner	 (1994)	 this	 information	 is	 regarded	 as	more	 reliable	
thus	 allowing	 the	 company	 to	 maintains	 its	 trust	 with	 stakeholders.	 However,	 the	
absence	 of	 information	may	 not	 necessarily	mean	 bad	 news	 for	 stakeholders	 and	 the	
consequence	 of	 this	 interpretation	 may	 give	 a	 false	 interpretation	 of	 the	 company’s	
value.	Stakeholders	are	in	fact	perfectly	aware	that	management	has	incentives	to	omit	
bad	news	in	the	financial	statements	in	order	to	prevent	"disclosure	costs".	A	behavior	
pattern	that	Patell‐Wolfson	(1982)	found	in	their	study	was	that	companies	in	the	stock	
market	 tend	 to	disclose	 the	good	news	early	 in	 the	 trading	day	while	 the	bad	news	 is	
presented	rather	close	to	the	end	of	the	trading	day.	
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2.4 Disclosures for Leases – According to K3 and Prior Regulations 
	
According	to	K3,	the	following	information	must	be	included	in	the	disclosures	for	leases	
presented	by	the	lessee:	
	
•	Future	minimum	lease	payments	at	balance	sheet	date	within	one	year,	later	than	one	
year	but	within	five	years	and	later	than	five	years.	
	
•	The	total	sum	of	the	financial	year’s	lease	costs.	
	
•	General	description	of	agreements	of	significant	leases.	
	
	
In	 Chapter	 2	 of	 K3	 the	 concepts	 and	 principles	 detail	what	 companies	must	 follow	 in	
their	financial	reports.	These	concepts	and	principles	are	however	not	prioritized	over	
what	 is	 stated	 in	 the	 law,	 other	 regulations	 or	 specific	 rules	 in	 K3.	 As	 the	 disclosure	
requirements	 presented	 above	 are	 prioritized,	 they	 cannot	 be	 omitted	 because	 of	
“materiality”	or	“the	balance	between	cost	and	benefit”	stated	in	that	chapter.	
	
Before	the	K	project,	The	Swedish	Accounting	Standards	Council	(RR)	together	with	BFN	
were	 responsible	 for	 the	 development	 of	 Swedish	 GAAP	 by	 giving	 out	 advice	 and	
recommendations.		RR	published	recommendations	for	several	years	that	were	intended	
for	companies	whose	shares	are	 traded	on	the	Swedish	stock	exchanges.	BFN	adapted	
the	recommendations	from	RR	to	better	suit	non‐listed	companies	(Derfeldt	&	Törning	
2012).	
	
The	 regulation	 for	 leases	 in	 BFN	 is	 described	 in	 BFNAR	 2000:4	 and	 leases	 for	 RR	 is	
described	 in	 RR	 6:99.	 BFNAR	 2000:4	 should	 correspond	 to	 RR	 6:99,	 with	 some	
exceptions	 in	 order	 to	 simplify	 the	 disclosure	 requirements	 for	 non‐listed	 companies.	
BFN	requires	considerably	less	comprehensive	disclosures	than	RR	regarding	leases	and	
these	differences	are	presented	in	BFNAR	2000:4.	The	biggest	differences	are	that	rent	
for	premises	is	excluded	from	the	lease	costs,	no	demand	for	specific	information	about	
the	future	minimum	lease	payments,	contingent	rents,	leasing	income	and	descriptions	
of	essential	agreements	of	leases	over	the	financial	period.	(BFNAR	2000:4).	
	
In	earlier	standards,	BFNAR	2000:4,	there	was	thus	an	exception	from	including	rent	for	
premises	in	the	disclosure	for	leases.	This	exception	is	however	not	found	in	K3	and	the	
rent	 for	 leases	 is	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 companies'	 disclosures	 (PwC	 2012).	 In	 other	
words,	the	disclosure	requirements	in	K3	is	considered	to	be	more	demanding	and	a	big	
change	for	companies	that	previously	complied	with	BFNAR	2000:4.	
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2.5 Selection of Audit Firm  
The	decisions	made	at	the	audit	firm	should	be	rational,	provided	that	the	persons	who	
are	doing	the	audit	have	the	knowledge	required	for	auditing.	According	to	Collin	et	al.	
(2008),	auditors	are	a	professional	group	who	can	use	their	knowledge	to	exert	pressure	
on	companies	by	requiring	the	companies	to	adapt	to	the	auditors’	structures,	therefore	
steering	 organizations	 in	 the	 direction	 that	 they	 see	 fit.	 If	 the	 company	 opposes	 the	
auditors,	 it	 can	 result	 in	 a	 modified	 auditor’s	 report.	 Therefore,	 Collin	 et	 al.	 (2008)	
established	 that	 companies	audited	by	one	of	 the	big	audit	 firms	would	disclose	more	
information.	
According	 to	 previous	 research	 by	 DeAngelo	 (1981),	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 size	 of	 the	
auditing	 firm	has	 a	direct	 impact	on	whether	or	not	 errors	 are	 reported.	The	 starting	
point	was	that	the	major	audit	firms	‐unlike	smaller	ones	‐	have	a	larger	customer	base,	
startup	 costs	 and	 transaction	 costs,	 all	 of	 which	 enable	 the	 auditor	 to	 make	 client‐
specific	quasi‐rents.	 If	 the	auditors	choose	not	to	report	a	"material"	error	 in	the	hope	
that	 customers	would	 remain	 loyal,	 a	 potential	 risk	will	 arise:	 	 other	 customers,	who	
prioritize	good	audit	quality	will	discover	the	auditor’s	misconduct	and	choose	another	
audit	firm.	It	was	therefore	concluded	that	the	major	audit	firms	performed	audits	of	a	
higher	quality	as	the	risk	of	loss	of	quasi‐rents	were	higher	due	to	a	large	customer	base.	
Several	 researchers	 have	 come	up	with	 the	 same	 conclusions,	 as	 an	 example,	O'Keefe	
and	 Westort	 (1992)	 identified	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 specialization	 and	 technological	
knowledge	 among	 the	 major	 audit	 firms	 as	 something	 that	 contributed	 to	 a	 positive	
correlation	 between	 size	 and	 quality.	 The	 accumulated	 knowledge	 is	 then	 passed	 on	
within	 the	 company	 through	 extensive	 personnel	 education.	 Camfferman	 &	 Cooke’s	
(2002)	study	of	 the	comprehensiveness	of	disclosure	 in	UK	and	Dutch	companies	also	
showed	 a	 relationship	 between	 choice	 of	 audit	 firms	 and	 level	 of	 disclosure	 using	
dummy	variables:	Big	6	or	not	Big	6.	The	study	showed	that	there	is	a	positive	relation	
between	Big	6	audit	firms	and	the	level	of	disclosures.		
The	study	done	by	Camfferman	&	Cooke	(2002)	is	as	mentioned	above	done	in	UK	and	
Netherlands	 but	 we	 believe	 that	 choice	 of	 audit	 firm	 among	 companies	 can	 be	
comparible	 on	 Swedish	 companies.	 The	 reason	 behind	 that	 is	 because	 we	 belive	 the	
mindset	 regarding	 choice	 of	 audit	 firms	 is	 kind	 of	 similar	 in	 northern	 Europe.	 The	
previous	research	in	general	that	is	mentioned	above	is	relevant	for	us	because	we	want	
to	 find	out	 if	 there	 is	 a	different	between	big	 four	audit	 firms	and	smaller	audit	 firms	
regarding	the	includement	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases	and	we	believe	
the	our	hypothesis	which	has	its	base	in	the	previous	research	can	help	us	answer	our	
question.		
Hypothesis	 1:	 There	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 choice	 of	 audit	 firms	 and	 the	
including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
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2.6 The Size of the Company  
	
Agent	 theory	 can	 explain	 the	 relationship	 between	 different	 stakeholders	 and	 their	
preferences,	 but	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 relation	 between	 agent	 and	 principal	 (Deegan	 &	
Unerman,	 2006).	 The	 most	 usual	 example	 used	 in	 this	 instance	 is	 the	 relationship	
between	shareholders	and	corporate	management.	There	may	be	an	imbalance	between	
them	 due	 to	 the	 asymmetrical	 information	 that	 occurs	 and	 which	 in	 turn	 can	 create	
uncertainty.	The	uncertainty	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	principals	wants	their	return	
of	 equity	 to	 be	 maximized	 while	 the	 agents	 wants	 to	 maximize	 their	 income	 (Saam,	
2007).	Agent	theory	reveals	how	a	principal	can	handle	this	uncertainty	by	making	the	
agent	act	according	to	the	principal’s	needs	by	using	accounting	information	to	reduce	
the	information	asymmetry	and	thus	controlling	the	agent.	This	is	based	on	the	theory’s	
assumption	that	individuals	are	rational	and	maximizing	their	resources,	which	can	lead	
to	conflicts	between	them	(Deegan	&	Unerman,	2006).		
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 imbalance	 between	 principal	 and	 agent	 is	 often	 based	 on	
information	 asymmetry,	 which	 could	 create	 so‐called	 agency	 costs.	 Since	 these	 costs	
increase	 as	 the	 business	 grows	 larger,	 companies	 tend	 to	 disclose	 information	 on	 a	
larger	scale	to	reduce	this	cost.	Therefore	we	find	this	factor	interesting	in	using	as	an	
independent	 variable.	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 other	 factors	 that	 explain	 the	 link,	 i.e	
larger	companies	have	more	complex	business	structures	that	require	a	higher	degree	of	
disclosures	(Cooke,	1989).	However,	according	to	Deegan	&	Unerman	(2006),	the	cost	of	
these	 conflicts	 could	 be	 avoided	by	 a	well‐functioning	organization.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	
the	 core	 of	 the	 agent	 theory	 is	 incentive	 problems.	 One	way	 to	 avoid	 these	 incentive	
problems	is	to	hire	an	independent	auditor	(Deegan	&	Unerman,	2006).	
	
The	essential	research	in	agent	theory	is	mainly	used	to	not	only	find	answers	on	how	
accounting,	compensation	schemes	and	information	is	affecting	incentive	problems,	but	
also	 on	 how	 the	 existence	 of	 these	 problems	 affect	 the	 structure	 and	 design	 of	 the	
financial	reports	(Deegan	&	Unerman	2006).	Previous	studies	show	that	company	size	
matters	when	 it	 comes	 to	quality	of	 information.	 For	 example,	 a	 larger	 company	with	
more	 resources	 is	 able	 to	 spend	 more	 on	 its	 accounting	 department	 in	 relation	 to	
smaller	 companies.	 This	 allows	 for	 a	 higher	 quality	 of	 accounting	 and	 disclosures	
(Glaum	et	al.	2012).	Especially	the	study	done	by	Glaum	et.	al	(2012)	and	the	discussion	
regarding	 information	asymmetry	were	key	factors	 in	which	we	believe	that	there	is	a	
significant	 relationship	 between	 the	 size	 of	 the	 company	 and	 whether	 the	 company	
includes	the	rent	for	premises	in	their	disclosure	of	 leases.	Agent	theory	together	with	
the	previous	research	led	us	to	our	second	hypothesis.		
	
Hypothesis	2:	There	 is	 a	 relationship	between	 the	 size	of	 the	 company	 and	 the	
including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
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2.7 Debt‐to‐equity and part of a group  
	
Debt	contracts	give	corporate	management	incentives	to	affect	how	financial	reports	are	
presented	 in	 order	 to	 satisfy	 the	 stakeholders,	 which	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 stakeholder	
perspective.	 Company	 legitimacy	 is	 created	 through	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
company	 and	 its	 stakeholders	 and	 for	 this	 reason	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 company	 to	
establish	good	relations	with	its	stakeholders.	Stakeholder	impact	may	differ	depending	
on	the	influence	that	the	stakeholders	have	on	the	company.	Greater	influence	over	the	
company	creates	a	greater	chance	for	the	company	to	follow	their	guidelines.	However,	
this	does	not	mean	that	the	company	only	has	a	certain	obligation	towards	larger	groups	
of	 stakeholders,	 in	 fact,	 it	 has	 the	 same	 obligations	 to	 all	 stakeholders.	 Examples	 of	
groups	that	have	a	greater	influence	on	companies	is	banks,	investors	and	owners	(Hill	
&	Jones	1992).	Companies	with	higher	debt	to	equity	ratio	are	generally	under	greater	
supervision	of	creditors	who	use	information	in	the	financial	reports	to	ensure	that	they	
do	 not	 violate	 the	 loan	 agreement	 (Jaggi	 &	 Low	 2000).	 Since	 the	 companies	who	 are	
heavily	 indebted	 is	 under	 greater	 supervision	 we	 believe	 the	 companies	 are	 more	
accurate	 in	 their	 providement	 of	 information	 in	 the	 financial	 reports.	 Therefore	 the	
debt‐to	equity	ratio	is	another	key	factor	that	can	help	us	answer	the	question	whether	
some	 companies	 includes	 the	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 their	 disclosure	 of	 leases	 and	why	
some	companies	do	not.		
Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	claimed	that	 firms	with	higher	debt	 to	equity	ratio	would	
have	 larger	 agent	 costs,	 the	 concept	 that	 we	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 To	
reduce	agent	costs,	it	is	expected	that	companies	that	are	heavily	indebted	will	provide	
more	information	in	their	financial	reports	(Watson	et	al.	2002).	
Hypothesis	3:	There	 is	 a	 relationship	between	 the	 debt	 to	 equity	 ratio	 and	 the	
including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.		
	
Furthermore,	the	stakeholders’	perspective	also	gives	us	our	fourth	and	final	hypothesis	
which	involves	groups.	When	a	company	belongs	to	a	group,	it	increases	the	amount	of	
stakeholders	they	have	since	the	group’s	stakeholders	also	becomes	the	company’s.	As	
mentioned	 above,	 companies	 have	 obligations	 towards	 all	 the	 stakeholders,	 which	
means	a	higher	demand	for	information	is	to	be	considered	in	the	financial	reports (Hill	
&	Jones.	1992).	It	goes	without	saying	that	this	is	an	interesting	relationship	to	explore	
because	of	the	major	numbers	of	stakeholders	that	are	added	to	the	company	belonging	
to	a	group.	Shareholders	are	very	interested	in	the	financial	statements	of	the	company	
because	 they	 have	 invested	money	 and	 would	 then	 of	 course	 have	 a	 return	 on	 their	
money.	Key	 figures	 in	 the	 financial	statements	are	a	good	tool	 for	measuring	potential	
future	 returns.	 That	 gives	 companies	 incentives	 to	 provide	more	 information	 in	 their	
annual	 reports	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 their	 stakeholders	 satisfied.	 Since	 the	 shareholders	
increases	when	a	company	becomes	part	of	a	group	we	believe	this	also	is	a	key	figure	
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whether	a	company	includes	the	rent	for	premises	in	their	disclosure	of	leases	and	why	
some	do	not (Jaggi	&	Low	2000).	
Also,	 the	amount	of	 information	 in	 the	 financial	 reports	may	differ	depending	on	who	
creates	 them.	Pettersson	 (2015)	describes	 in	her	 thesis	 an	example	where	a	 company	
previously	hired	an	affiliated	company	to	draw	up	its	annual	report.	The	content	of	the	
information	 was	 often	 standardized	 in	 order	 to	 minimize	 costs,	 which	 limited	 the	
possibilities	of	 establishing	 complete	business	 information.	 Later,	 the	parent	 company	
itself	took	over	the	reporting	of	its	financial	statements,	which	gave	greater	freedom	to	
disclose	 more	 information	 without	 any	 additional	 costs.	 This	 resulted	 in	 a	 more	
complete	 annual	 report	 and	 the	 disclosures	 increased	 significantly.	 With	 our	 final	
hypothesis,	we	test	if	there	is	a	relation	between	the	including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	
disclosure	of	leases	and	if	the	company	is	part	of	a	group.	
Hypothesis	4:	There	 is	a	relationship	between	 if	 the	company	 is	part	of	a	group	
and	the	including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
	
	
2.8 Summary of the Hypotheses 
	
The	conclusion	of	the	theoretical	framework	has	created	several	hypotheses,	which	are	
summarized	below	in	the	order	they	were	presented	in	the	text.	We	have	also	created	a	
hypotheses	model	(figure	2.1),	which	summarizes	the	factors	that	can	explain	whether	
or	not	companies	include	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
	
Hypothesis	1:	There	is	a	relationship	between	the	choice	of	audit	firm	and	the	including	
of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
	
Hypothesis	 2:	 There	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 size	 of	 the	 company	 and	 the	
including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
	
Hypothesis	3:	There	 is	a	relationship	between	the	debt‐to‐equity	and	the	 including	of	
rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
	
Hypothesis	4:	There	is	a	relationship	between	if	the	company	is	part	of	a	group	and	the	
including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
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The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	to	what	extent	companies	who	comply	with	K3	
achieve	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 leasing	 disclosure	 regarding	 rent	 for	 premises	 and	
furthermore,	to	create	hypotheses	of	possible	factors	that	have	an	impact	on	whether	or	
not	these	disclosures	requirements	for	 leases	are	met.	Based	on	this	purpose,	we	have	
created	our	theoretical	framework	and	hypotheses	from	the	agent	theory,	the	theory	of	
stakeholders’	 perspective	 and	 previous	 research.	 The	 theories	 together	with	 previous	
research	have	been	the	basis	for	the	creation	of	four	hypotheses,	which	we	later	on	will	
statistically	 test	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 including	 of	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	
leases.	 The	 first	 hypothesis	 was	 choice	 of	 audit	 firm.	 The	 choice	 of	 audit	 firm	 can	
influence	 whether	 compliance	 with	 the	 regulation	 is	 achieved	 due	 to	 the	 level	 of	
knowledge	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 audit	 at	 the	 audit	 firm	 (DeAngelo,	 1981;	 O’Keefe	 &	
Westort,	1992;	Cafferman	&	Cooke,	2002).	 	The	second	hypothesis	was	 the	size	of	 the	
company.	 Bigger	 companies,	 in	 relation	 to	 smaller	 companies,	 have	 the	 resources	 to	
ensure	complete	disclosures	in	the	financial	reports	and	by	revealing	more	information	
the	 information	asymmetry	 tends	 to	decrease	 (Deegan	&	Unerman,	2006;	Glaum	et	al.	
2012).	This	should	create	a	positive	relationship	between	disclosure	of	information	and	
the	 company	 size.	 Finally,	 through	 the	 stakeholders’	 perspective	we	 have	 created	 the	
hypotheses	that	debt‐to‐equity	and	part	of	a	group	are	variables	that	influence	whether	
or	 not	 companies	 disclose	 sufficient	 information	 and	 in	 this	 case	 regarding	 the	
disclosures	 of	 leases.	 Companies	 that	 are	 part	 of	 a	 group	 have	 more	 stakeholders	 to	
satisfy	with	 information	and	 the	 same	 is	 true	 for	 companies	 that	 are	heavily	 indebted	
and	 thereby	 have	 creditors	 who	 demand	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 information	 (Jaggi	 &	 Low	
2000;	 Hill	 &	 Jones,	 1992;	 Jensen	 and	 Meckling,	 1976;	 Watson	 et	 al.	 2002).	 The	
theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 hypotheses	 are	 the	 basis	 for	 our	
hypotheses	model	(Figure	2.1),	which	examines	possible	factors	that	have	an	impact	on	
whether	 or	 not	 disclosure	 requirements	 for	 leases	 are	met	 regarding	 the	 including	 of	
rent	for	premises.		
	
 
	 	 	 																							Figure	2.1	Hypotheses	model		
	
	
Audit	firm	
Company	size
Debt‐to‐equity
Group
Including	of	rent	for	
premises	in	the	
disclosure	of	leases
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3. Method 
	
This	chapter	aims	to	describe	the	approach	behind	the	thesis.	This	is	presented	along	with	
a	description	of	the	method	we	used.	
	
3.1 The Study Design 
	
The	 design	 of	 the	 study	 depends	 on	 how	 we	 present	 the	 problem.	 Surveys	 can	 be	
divided	 into	 two	 categories:	 first,	 an	 extensive	 structure	 and	 secondly,	 an	 intensive	
structure.	An	extensive	structure	means	that	a	large	number	of	observations	take	place	
while	an	intense	structure	means	that	a	few	observations	are	carried	out	more	carefully	
(Jacobsen,	2002).	
	
First	 of	 all,	 we	 have	 a	main	 question	where	we	 determine	 the	 information	 quality	 of	
companies	who	 are	 complying	with	K3	 or	more	 specifically:	 if	 the	 companies	 include	
rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosures	 of	 leases.	 An	 extensive	 structure	 was	 the	 most	
suitable	category	in	regard	to	our	main	question	since	we	are	making	a	large	number	of	
observations,	 specifically	 200.	 Through	 this	 kind	 of	 process,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 get	
information	about	the	extent	of	the	potential	problem.	
Then	we	want	to	determine	the	factors	that	affect	companies’	non‐compliance	with	the	
disclosure	 requirements	 of	 leases	 in	 K3.	 More	 specifically,	 if	 there	 is	 any	 correlation	
between	the	possibility	of	companies	including	rent	for	premises	and:	the	choice	of	audit	
firms,	debt‐to‐equity,	size	of	the	company	and	if	they	are	part	of	a	group.	
3.2 Selection of theories 
	
After	studying	earlier	research	done	by	Collin	et	al.	(2008),	Deegan	&	Unerman	(2006),	
Glaum	et	al.	 (2012)	and	Watson	et	al.	 (2002),	among	others,	 the	need	arose	 to	build	a	
theoretical	 framework	 based	 on	 two	 theories:	 agency	 theory	 and	 stakeholders’	
perspective.	These	theories	were	relevant	for	our	study	since	they	have	occurred	in	the	
research	 we	 have	 reviewed.	 Based	 on	 the	 theories	 ‐	 along	 with	 earlier	 research	 ‐we	
formed	 hypotheses	 which	 we	 will	 test	 to	 see	 if	 there	 are	 correlations	 between	 the	
dependent	variable	and	the	independent	variables.	
3.3 Keywords and databases used 
 
The	databases	used	for	the	search	of	theories	and	previous	research	was:	ScienceDirect,	
Google	 Scholar	 and	 Business	 Source	 Premier.	 The	 keywords	 that	 were	 used	 on	 the	
databases	 were:	 Agent	 Theory,	 Stakeholders’	 Perspective,	 Accounting	 Choice,	
Accounting	Quality,	Disclosures,	K3	and	Audit	firm.		
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3.4 Selection of Annual Reports as an Information Channel   
	
There	was	a	discussion	about	which	 information	channel	would	be	used	 in	the	survey	
and	it	was	important	that	the	information	was	reliable	for	statistical	analysis.	Validity	is	
an	expression	that	deals	with	reliability	and	accuracy	in	a	quantitative	study	(Bryman	&	
Bell,	2013).	Validity	addresses	whether	 the	researcher	measures	what	he/she	actually	
intends	to	measure	and	the	importance	of	providing	the	dependent	variable	versus	the	
independent	variables	in	the	statistical	analysis.		
	
The	choice	of	annual	reports	as	an	information	channel	was	obvious	since	the	reliability	
is	 high	 in	 these	 kinds	 of	 sources.	 Furthermore,	 the	 reports	 are	 easily	 available	 and	
consequently	create	advantages	 in	a	survey	context	 (Smith,	2006).	The	annual	reports	
often	 show	whether	 or	 not	 companies	 include	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	
leases,	 which	means	 that	 the	 first	 question	 is	 rather	 simple	 to	 answer.	 However,	 the	
contributing	 factors	 regarding	 why	 some	 companies	 do	 not	 meet	 the	 disclosure	
requirements	 of	 K3	 cannot	 be	 answered	 through	 annual	 reports	 alone,	 nevertheless,	
these	 factors	 will	 be	 investigated	 using	 statistical	 analysis	 and	 discussed	 later	 in	 the	
thesis.	Ax	and	Marton	(2008)	explains	that	the	annual	reports	are	important	documents	
through	 which	 the	 company	 can	 present	 financial	 information	 to	 communicate	 and	
show	what	their	intentions	for	the	future	of	the	company	are.	The	reports	show	what	the	
company	 considers	 to	 be	 important	 (Ax	 &	Marton,	 2008).	 Therefore,	 the	 information	
that	is	made	available	contributes	to	the	society’s	perception	of	the	organization	(Hooks,	
Coy	&	Davey,	2002).	
	
3.5 Selection and Data Acquisition 
	
When	the	selection	of	observations	were	to	be	chosen	the	starting	point	was	to	search	
for	 large	and	small	public	 limited	 liability	companies	 in	Sweden	complying	with	K3	 in	
the	trade	industry.	One	of	the	reasons	that	all	of	the	companies	in	Sweden	were	included	
is	 that	we	 did	 not	want	 to	 encounter	 any	 regional	 discrepancies.	 The	 annual	 reports,	
which	 are	 the	primary	 source	 of	 information,	were	 obtained	 from	Retriever	Business.	
We	did	 an	extended	 search	 in	Retriever	Business	which	 resulted	 in	16921	 companies	
and	the	search	criteria	in	Retriever	Business	was	as	follows:	
	
 Number	of	employees:	1	‐	∞	
 Turnover:	1	000	tkr	‐	∞	
 Industry:	Retail	industry	
 Area:	All	counties	
 Stock	Exchange	List:	Not	registered	in	the	stock	exchange	lists	
	
The	reason	why	we	chose	such	a	large	range	in	the	expanded	search	was	to	be	sure	to	
also	 include	 smaller	 companies	 that	 comply	 with	 K3.	 The	 companies	 observed	 were	
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randomly	selected.	Our	first	thought	was	to	use	the	random	number	generator	in	excel.	
However,	there	was	a	problem	in	that	regard	since	we	did	not	manage	to	export	the	lists	
with	 companies	 from	Retriever	 Business	 into	 excel.	 For	 this	 reason,	we	 designed	 our	
own	system	for	selection.	The	procedure	was	as	such	that	one	of	us	was	sitting	with	a	
computer	with	 the	 lists	 from	Retriever	Business	while	 the	other	one	 sat	opposite	and	
could	in	that	way	not	see	the	list	of	companies.	The	one	who	did	not	have	the	computer	
said	random	numbers	between	1‐20	(which	is	the	number	of	companies	displayed	per	
page)	 that	 the	other	person	 then	 included	 for	our	collection	of	data.	The	same	system	
was	used	 in	 the	 selection	of	pages.	We	 felt	 it	was	 important	 that	 the	 companies	were	
randomly	 selected	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	more	 known	 companies	 possibly	 dominating	 the	
study	 due	 to	 subjective	 interference.	 Out	 of	 the	 200	 companies	 that	 we	 originally	
selected,	there	were	22	who	we	chose	to	reject	from	the	survey.	The	reason	was	that	we	
could	not	 determine	 if	 the	 companies	 actually	 included	 rent	 for	 premises,	 since	 those	
companies	did	not	specify	what	was	included	in	the	leases.	
	
As	we	mentioned	earlier,	the	data	collection	began	by	searching	for	Swedish	companies	
complying	 with	 K3	 in	 the	 trade	 industry.	 This	 was	 done	 with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 checklist	
drawn	 up	 in	 Excel	 where	 information	 was	 collected	 about	 the	 companies’	 name,	
including	 of	 rent	 for	 premises,	 size,	 choice	 of	 audit	 firm,	 debt‐to‐equity,	 and	 if	 the	
companies	were	part	of	a	group	(see	Appendix	1).	This	checklist	then	formed	the	basis	
for	the	statistical	analysis	done	using	the	computer	program	“Statistical	Package	for	the	
Social	Sciences”	(SPSS).	
	
3.6 Critism of the method 
 
When	talking	about	the	criticism	of	the	method,	we	often	use	the	terms	reliability	and	
validity.	 Even	 though	 the	 terms	 appear	 to	 be	 synonymous	with	 each	 other,	 they	 hold	
very	 different	 meanings	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 assessing	 the	 measure	 of	 the	 different	
concepts.	Regardless	of	how	 the	 collection	of	 empirical	data	 is	done	 it	 should	be	both	
valid	and	reliable.	The	empirical	data	that	we	collect	in	the	form	of	annual	reports	must	
be	valid,	that	means	that	the	information	we	study	must	be	current	and	relevant	to	what	
we	want	to	investigate	(Bryman	&	Bell,	2013).	
	
In	a	quantitative	study,	 it	 is	 important	that	the	source	of	 information	is	of	high	quality	
and	 reliability,	which	we	believe	our	 source	 of	 information	 is	beacuse	we	 analyze	 the	
companies'	annual	reports.	In	our	study	we	use	previous	research	and	existing	theories	
and	 based	 on	 these,	 we	 develope	 our	 hypotheses.	 We	 have	 found	 very	 few	 studies	
examining	 similar	 problem	 that	 we	 have.	 That	 is	 probably	 because	 our	 problem	
definition	 is	 relatively	 new.	 It	will	 therefore	 be	 difficult	 to	 compare	 our	 findings	with	
earlier	studies,	which	can	be	considered	as	a	weakness	in	the	paper.		
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Reliability	can	also	be	judged	by	how	easy	it	is	to	recreate	the	same	survey	and	get	the	
same	 results	 (Bryman	 &	 Bell,	 2013).	 	 Since	 we	 used	 a	 method	 where	 we	 randomly	
selected	the	companies	for	the	survey,	the	recreation	of	the	results	by	the	same	method	
is	 not	 possible.	 However,	 an	 advantage	 using	 this	 kind	 of	 method	 is	 that	 the	 results	
cannot	be	manipulated,	as	it	could	be	if	we	selectively	chosen	the	companies.	The	risks	
with	selectively	choosing	companies	are	that	subjective	interests	may	influence	the	data	
collection.	 It	 can	 also	be	 seen	 as	 a	weakness	 as	 it	 becomes	much	more	difficult	 to	 re‐
create	 the	 same	 survey	 and	 confirm	 the	 results.	 One	 can	 of	 course	 use	 the	 same	
companies	as	we	have	done	and	thus	confirm	the	results,	however,	it	will	then	not	be	a	
randomly	selected	data	collection.	Furthermore,	the	random	data	generator	we	created	
can	be	seen	as	weakness.	 It	would	perhaps	have	been	better	 to	use	a	random	number	
generator	 in	 Microsoft	 Excel.	 This	 was	 our	 intention	 at	 first,	 but	 since	 there	 was	
technical	problems	extract	data	from	Retriever	Business	into	Excel	it	prevented	us	to	do	
so.	But	 since	we	divided	 the	 task	of	 selecting	 the	 companies	 to	 two	persons,	we	have	
decreased	the	risk	of	manipulated	data	in	the	thesis.	
	
Validity	 shows	 if	 the	 study	measures	what	 is	 crucial	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	
question	 (Bryman	 &	 Bell,	 2013).	 In	 this	 thesis,	 validity	 corresponds	 to	 how	well	 our	
hypotheses	can	answer	our	research	questions.	We	believe	the	hypotheses	can	explain	
some	of	the	variation	regarding	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	The	subject	
of	the	first	research	question,	to	what	extent	companies	include	rent	for	premises	in	the	
disclosures	of	leases,	was	examined	by	using	the	companies’	financial	reports,	which	we	
believe	answered	the	research	question.	Thereby,	the	validity	of	this	method	was	high.	
The	 second	 research	 question,	 which	 was	 what	 factors	 could	 be	 behind	 potential	
variations	in	the	disclosures	of	leases,	could	however	be	approached	otherwise.	In	order	
to	 fully	 reveal	 more	 factors,	 a	 more	 openly	 approach	 through	 interviews	 could	
contribute	to	answer	the	second	research	question.	This	could	lead	to	more	hypotheses	
that	could	answer	the	potential	variations	in	the	disclosures	of	leases	and	consequently	
contribute	 to	 better	 validity.	 Due	 to	 limitations	 in	 time,	 this	 was	 unfortunately	 not	
possible.		
	
3.7 Analysis models 
	
The	 following	will	 present	 the	models	 that	were	used	 to	 analyse	 the	data	 collected	 in	
order	to	test	the	hypotheses.		
3.7.1 Correlation analysis   
The	 correlation	 coefficient	 measures	 if	 there	 is	 a	 linear	 relationship	 between	 two	
variables	 and	 it	 describes	 the	 direction	 as	 well	 as	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 potential	
relationship	between	the	variables.	The	coefficient	is	described	within	a	range	between	
(‐1)	to	(+1)	and	where	(‐1)	means	that	the	correlation	is	perfectly	negative,	and	(+1)	the	
relationship	is	perfectly	positive.	However,	if	the	correlation	coefficient	is	0	there	is	no	
linear	relationship,	and	the	more	the	coefficient	departs	from	0	the	stronger	the	linear	
relationship	(Bryman	&	Bell,	2013).		
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In	 this	 thesis,	 we	 computed	 the	 Pearson's	 correlation	 by	 using	 SPSS	 Statistics.	 This	
model	was	chosen	to	investigate	the	linear	relationship	between	our	four	independent	
variables:	 company	size,	 the	choice	of	audit	 firm,	debt‐to‐equity	and	 if	 the	company	 is	
part	 of	 a	 group	 and	 if	 these	 have	 a	 relationship	 with	 our	 dependent	 variable:	 the	
inclusion	 of	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leases.	We	 believe	 this	 model	 is	 a	
suitable	 tool	 in	 our	 thesis	 and	 clearly	 shows	 whether	 or	 not	 there	 is	 a	 correlation	
between	the	variables.	This	way,	we	could	indicate	whether	or	not	our	hypotheses	that	
were	 created	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 could	 explain	 the	 companies’	 choice	 of	
excluding	rent	of	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	 leases	and	thus	answering	the	research	
question	regarding	the	factors	that	may	impact	this	choice.		
While	 carrying	 out	 a	 test	 for	 linear	 regression,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 detect	 severe	
multicollinearity.	Perfect	multicollinearity	 is	when	 two	or	more	 independent	variables	
have	an	exact	linear	relationship	(Kelly	&	Jaggia,	2013).	A	high	level	of	multicollinearity	
may	cause	problems	in	deriving	the	impact	on	the	dependent	variable	to	the	appropriate	
independent	 variable.	 According	 Stud	 Mund	 (2011),	 correlation	 between	 the	
independent	 variables	 should	 not	 exceed	 0.8,	 otherwise	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 misleading	
results.	 This	 was	 something	 that	 we	 encountered	 in	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 thesis.	
Multicollinearity	 existed	 between	 our	 variables	 “number	 of	 employees”	 and	 “total	
assets”	 which	 represented	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 company	 size.	 Since	 the	 hypothesis	 was	
based	 on	 the	 stakeholders’	 perspective	 we	 chose	 to	 exclude	 the	 variable	 “number	 of	
employees”,	as	we	assume	that	the	shareholderse	are	more	interested	in	the	companies’	
total	assets	than	number	of	employees.	
	
3.7.2 Binary logistic regression  
	
Through	 the	 hypotheses	 created	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 and	 the	 collected	 data,	 we	
tested	 the	 relationship	 between	 our	 four	 independent	 variables:	 company	 size,	 the	
choice	of	audit	firm,	debt‐to‐equity	and	part	of	a	group	against	our	dependent	variable,	
which	is	the	including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	In	order	to	answer	
our	 research	 question	 and	 establish	 if	 our	 hypotheses	 could	 explain	 the	 potential	
variation	 in	disclosures	of	 leases,	we	used	binary	 logistic	 regression	 in	SPSS	Statistics.	
Logistic	 regression	 analyses	 the	 odds	 that	 a	 given	 observation	 belongs	 to	 a	 specific	
group,	 given	 a	 certain	 value	 of	 the	 independent	 variables.	 Thus,	 the	 odds	 can	 be	
estimated	on	whetever	or	not	 companies	will	 include	 rent	 for	premises	depending	on	
the	values	of	our	independent	variables	and	this	will	consequently	establish	a	potential	
relationship	(Barmark	&	Djurfeldt	2009).	
	
The	variables	used	in	this	thesis	is	a	mixture	of	both	binary	and	quantitave	values.	For	
instance,	our	dependent	variable:	the	including	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	
leases	has	two	outcomes,	either	rent	is	included	or	not.	Since	logistic	regression	has	the	
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ability	to	test	both	binary	and	quantitative	data	against	a	binary	dependent	variable,	 it	
was	the	analysis	model	that	satisfied	the	study’s	needs	(Barmark	&	Djurfeldt	2009).		
	
In	the	test	statistics	we	used	a	significance	level	of	10	%,	which	means	that	variables	that	
do	not	satisfy	this	qualification	will	rejected	from	the	study	since	we	cannot	assert	with	
certainty	that	a	relationship	exists.	The	significance	level	of	10	%	was	chosen	since	our	
research	topic	was	unexplored	(Körner	&	Wahlgren,	2006).	
	
3.8 Empirical Operationalization  
	
To	make	a	theoretical	concept	measurable,	one	needs	to	operationalize	the	concept	and	
this	is	done	through	the	collection	of	data	in	verbal	or	numerical	form.	The	purpose	of	
this	 process	 is	 to	 make	 it	 possible	 for	 a	 statistical	 analysis	 of	 the	 quantitative	 data	
(Davidson	&	Patel,	2003).	
	
In	order	to	fit	the	data	into	the	regression	model	we	had	to	translate	the	data	to	binary	
numbers,	which	is	presented	next	along	with	all	of	the	study’s	variables.	
3.8.1 Dependent Variable  
 
The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 composed	 of	 binary	 numbers	 that	 represent	 two	 different	
outcomes.	If	the	company	includes	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases,	we	label	
the	 company	with	 the	number	one,	 and	vice	versa.	Companies	 that	do	not	 include	 for	
premises	will	get	a	zero.	It	is	important	in	this	case	that	one	can	undoubtedly	determine	
whether	the	rent	was	included	or	not.	For	a	company	to	be	in	category	one,	i.e.	the	rent	
included,	 it	must	 explicitly	 state	 in	 the	 disclosure	 for	 leases	 that	 rent	 for	 premises	 is	
included.	However,	there	are	different	scenarios	for	a	company	to	be	labeled	as	zero	and	
in	order	to	explain	this	we	have	chosen	to	give	examples	below:			
	
•	The	company	has	no	buildings	in	the	balance	sheet	and	trades	in	merchandise,	but	do	
not	have	a	leasing	disclosure.	
	
•	 The	 company	has	 no	buildings	 in	 the	 balance	 sheet	 and	 trades	 in	merchandise.	The	
company	has	specified	what	is	included	in	leases	but	rent	for	premises	is	not	mentioned.		
	
•	 The	 company	 has	 no	 buildings	 in	 the	 balance	 sheet	 and	 trades	 in	 merchandise.	 In	
either	the	definition	of	leases	or	in	disclosure	for	leases	it	is	stated	that	rent	for	premises	
is	intentionally	not	included.		
	
In	order	 to	demonstrate	how	the	 leasing	disclosure	according	 to	K3	regulation	should	
look	 like,	we	have	selected	an	example	 from	our	collection	of	data	 that	represents	 the	
correct	way	to	disclose	leasing	information.		This	example	is	available	in	Appendix	2.		
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3.8.2 Independent Variables 
3.8.2.1 Company Size 
	
Glaum	et	al.	(2012)	and	Deegan	&	Unerman	(2006),	states	that	company	size	contribute	
to	 level	of	disclosure	and	 informationasymmetry	which	 is	described	 in	our	 theoretical	
framework.	 Based	 on	 that,	 we	 chose	 to	 investigate	 whether	 company	 size	 has	 a	
statistical	relationship	with	includement	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
We	 chose	 to	 collect	 the	 balance	 of	 sheets	 total	 for	 each	 company.	We	 chose	 this	 size	
indicator	 because	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 three	 used	 in	 (ÅRL)	 to	 determine	 if	 a	 company	 is	
categorized	 as	 large	 or	 small.	 Company	 size	 is	 then	 tested	 against	 our	 dependent	
variable,	which	is,	includement	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases	in	order	
to	demonstrate	a	possible	link.	
	
	
3.8.2.2 Big four Audit Firms 
 
In	 accordance	with	 our	 hypothesis,	which	 is	 based	 on	 our	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	
choice	of	audit	firm	may	influence	whether	compliance	with	the	regulation	is	achieved	
due	to	the	 level	of	knowledge	and	the	quality	of	 the	audit	at	 the	audit	 firm	(DeAngelo,	
1981;	O’Keefe	&	Westort,	1992;	Cafferman	&	Cooke,	2002).	In	order	to	test	the	relation	
between	choice	of	audit	firm	and	the	including	of	rent	for	premises,	we	had	to	make	it	
possible	 for	 a	 statistical	 analysis.	 Thus,	we	 classified	 the	 four	 largest	 audit	 firms	 "Big	
Four",	which	consists	of	Deloitte,	EY,	KPMG	and	PwC	to	the	binary	number	one	(Marton	
2013).	The	remaining	audit	firms	were	classified	as	zero.	
 
3.8.2.3 Part of a Group 
 
In	 accordance	 with	 our	 hypothesis,	 there	 may	 be	 a	 positive	 relation	 between	 the	
including	of	rent	 for	premises	 in	 the	disclosure	of	 leases	and	if	a	company	 is	part	of	a	
group.	 This	 hypothesis	 is	 based	 on	 stakeholders’	 perspective,	 which	 says	 that	 the	
company	 has	 the	 same	 obligations	 to	 all	 stakeholders,	 regardless	 the	 size	 of	 the	
stakeholders’	 investment.	 (Hill	 &	 Jones,	 1992).	With	 that	 in	mind,	 an	 increasement	 of	
stakeholders	 should	 consequently	 also	 increase	 the	 demand	 for	 information	 in	 the	
financial	reports.		We	used	the	search	engine	“Retriever	Business”	and	companies	group	
tree	to	establish	whether	or	not	the	companies	were	part	of	a	group.	If	a	company	was	
part	 of	 a	 group	we	 classified	 it	 as	 the	 binary	 number	 one.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 companies	
were	classified	as	zero.	
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3.8.2.4 Debt‐to‐equity Ratio 
 
In	accordance	with	our	hypothesis,	there	should	be	a	relation	between	the	including	of	
rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases	and	the	debt‐to‐equity	ratio	of	a	company,	
since	 companies	 that	 are	 heavily	 indebted	 tend	 to	 provide	more	 information	 in	 their	
financial	 reports	 (Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976;	Watson	et	al.	2002).	Through	“Retriever	
Business”,	 we	 collected	 information	 about	 the	 companies’	 equity‐to‐assets	 ratio	 and	
since	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 mathematical	 relationship	 between	 the	 key	 ratios,	 the	 debt‐to‐
equity	 ratio	 could	 be	 calculated	 from	 the	 companies’	 equity‐to‐assets	 ratio	 (Nilsson,	
Isaksson	 &	 Martikainen	 2002).	 Unlike	 equity‐to‐assets	 ratio,	 which	 explains	 the	
relationship	 between	 equity	 and	 total	 assets,	 the	 debt‐to‐equity	 ratio	 explain	 the	
relationship	between	debt	and	equity.	The	information	content	of	the	two	measures	 is	
basically	the	same,	however	the	debt‐to‐equity	ratio	can	be	seen	as	an	inversely	equity‐
to‐assets	ratio.	For	example,	 if	equity‐to‐assets	ratio	decreases	 then	the	debt‐to‐equity	
ratio	 increases	 (Johansson	 &	 Runsten	 2005).	 The	 formula	 we	 have	 used	 to	 convert	
equity‐to‐assets	ratio	to	debt‐to‐equity	is	presented	below.	
	
ࡰࢋ࢈࢚ െ ࢚࢕ െ ࢋ࢛ࢗ࢏࢚࢟ ൌ ૚ࡿ࢕࢒࢏ࢊ࢏࢚࢟	 െ ૚	
	
																																																																																													(Nilsson,	Isaksson	&	Martikainen	2002)	
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
	
The	following	chapter	will	firstly	present	the	results	from	our	quantitative	research	which	
will	 answer	 how	many	 companies	 have	 and	 have	 not	 included	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	
disclosure	of	leases.	Secondly,	descriptive	statistics	will	show	the	basic	features	of	the	data	
collected	 in	 this	 study.	 Thirdly,	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 independent	
variables	correlate	with	each	other	a	bivariate	correlation	analysis	will	be	presented	and	
discussed.	Lastly,	as	part	of	the	study’s	analysis	a	binary	regression	analysis	will	interpret	
the	data	collected	and	answer	if	the	hypotheses	can	correctly	explain	the	variation	of	the	
dependent	variable.		
 
4.1 Descriptive Data  
	
The	figure	below	displays	the	numbers	of	companies	that	included	rent	for	premises	in	
the	 disclosure	 of	 leases	 and	 the	 companies	 that	 have	 not.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 56	
companies	out	of	178	have	not	 included	rent	 for	premises,	which	 is	equivalent	to	31.5	
percent	 and	 whereas	 122	 have	 rightfully	 disclosed	 rent	 for	 premises,	 which	 is	 68.5	
percent	of	the	total	companies	observed.		
	
	
		
							Figure	4.1	Number	of	companies	that	include	and	do	not	include	rent	for	premises.	
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The	 table	below	presents	 the	descriptive	statistics	of	 the	 independent	variables	which	
are	total	assets	and	debt‐to‐equity	ratio.		
	
	
Continuous	variables		 Numbers	of	companies	 Standard	Deviation	 Mean	 Minimum	 Maximum	
Total	assets	(MSEK)	 178	 1387.5	 450.8		 2.2		 14153.2	
Debt‐to‐equity	ratio	 178	 25.2	 6.5	 ‐50.8	 293.1	
Table	4.1	Descriptive	data	numerical	variables	
	
	
The	total	assets	within	each	of	the	178	companies	has	a	mean	of	450.8	million	SEK	and	a	
standard	deviation	of	1387.5	million	SEK	whereas	the	minimum	is	2.2	million	SEK	and	
the	maximum	is	14153.2	million	SEK.	The	mean	of	the	companies’	debt‐to‐equity	ratio	is	
6.5	and	the	standard	deviation	is	25.2	whereas	the	minimum	is	‐50.8	and	the	maximum	
is	293.1.	
	
	
	
This	time,	the	table	below	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	of	the	binary	independent	
variables	which	are	part	of	a	group	and	big	four	audit	firms.		
	
	
Variable	 Number	of	companies	 Rent	included	 Did	not	include	rent	
Part	of	a	group		 156	 115	 41	
Not	part	of	a	group	 22	 7	 15	
Table	4.2	Descriptive	data	binary	variables	
	
Out	of	 the	total	178	companies	observed,	156	companies	were	part	of	a	group	and	22	
were	not.	115	of	the	companies	that	were	part	of	a	group	included	rent	for	premises	in	
the	 disclosure	 of	 leases	wheras	 41	 did	 not.	 Seven	 companies	 that	 were	 not	 part	 of	 a	
group	included	rent	for	premises,	whereas	15	did	not.		
	
	
Inclusion	of	rent	 Big	four	audit	firm	 Not	big	four	audit	firms	 Total	
Included	rent	for	premesis	 92	 30	 122	
Did	not	include	rent	for	premises	 27	 29	 56	
Table	4.2.1	Descriptive	data	binary	variables	
	
As	 described	 above	 in	 the	 table,	 92	 out	 of	 the	 companies	 that	 did	 include	 rent	 for	
premises	 had	 on	 of	 the	 big	 four	 as	 their	 audit	 firm	whereas	 30	 companies	 had	 other	
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audit	firms.	However,	out	of	the	56	companies	that	did	not	include	rent	for	premises,	27	
had	hired	one	of	the	big	four	firms	and	the	rest,	29	companies,	was	audited	by	others.		
	
	
4.2 Correlation Analysis  
	
As	we	can	see	from	the	table	below	the	Pearson	correlation	test	indicates	that	there	is	a	
statistical	 significance	 correlation	 between	 our	 dependent	 variable	 and	 all	 the	
independent	except	the	Debt‐to‐equity	ratio.	The	significance	value	on	this	test	was	set	
to	below	0.05,	which	is	not	achieved	with	the	debt‐to‐equity	ratio.	Even	though	there	is	
in	fact	significance	correlation	with	the	dependent	variable	in	the	cases	stated	above,	it	
is	 not	 an	 especially	 strong	 correlation.	 The	 hypothesis	 that	 companies,	 which	 have	 a	
larger	 amount	 of	 total	 assets,	 have	 a	more	 correct	 leasing	 disclosure	 confirms	 as	 the	
strongest	correlation	in	this	test.		
	
	
Column1 
Rent for  
Premises  Total assets  Debt‐to‐equity ratio  Part of a group  Big four audit firm 
Rent for premises    1 
Total assets  .175*      1 
Debt‐to‐equity ratio  ‐.125  .016      1 
Part of a group  .297**  .09  .076     1 
Big four audit firms  .278**  .15*  ‐.056  .03     1 
Table	4.3	Correlation	Analysis	
	
*	Correlation	is	significance	at	the	0.1	level		
**	Correlation	is	significance	at	the	0.01	level	
	
4.3 Regression Analysis  
	
The	 table	 below	 displays	 the	 results	 from	 our	 binary	 regression	 analysis,	 which	
addresses	 our	 research	 question	whether	 or	 not	 our	 independent	 has	 an	 explanatory	
relation	with	our	dependent	variable.	The	results	show	a	value	of	0.427	for	Nagelkrerke	
R	 Square,	which	means	 that	 42.7	%	of	 the	 variance	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable	 can	 be	
explained	by	the	variation	in	the	variables	in	the	model	(Barmark	&	Djurfeldt	2009).	
	
In	the	test	of	our	hypotheses	we	chose	a	lower	limit	of	0.1	for	the	significance	level.	In	
other	 words	 the	 independent	 variables	 that	 do	 not	 satisfy	 this	 qualification	 will	 be	
rejected	from	the	study	since	we	cannot	assert	with	certainty	that	a	relationship	exists.		
However,	 we	 can	 say	 with	 90	 %	 certainty	 that	 the	 variables	 that	 do	 meet	 this	
qualification	have	a	relationship	which	did	not	occur	by	chance.	For	 the	variables	 that	
however	do	meet	this	qualification,	we	can	with	90	%	certainty	say	that	the	relation	is	
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not	occurred	by	chance.		Since	the	number	of	observations	exceeds	30	there	will	be	no	
need	to	test	if	the	residuals	are	normally	distributed	(Körner	&	Wahlgren,	2006).		
	
	
	
	
Variables                   Beta                          Sig.                           
Constant  ‐2.19  .000 
Total assets  .007  0,00006 
Debt‐to‐equity ratio  ‐.027  .082 
Part of a group  1.63  .004 
Big four audit firms  .872  .030 
  
Dependent variable   Rent for premises     
N  178    
Nagelkerke R Square  0.427    
	 	 	 Table	4.4	Regression	Analysis	
	
4.3.1 Total Assets  
	
In	accordance	with	the	hypothesis	created,	H1,	 the	size	of	 the	company	most	probably	
has	an	impact	on	whether	or	not	the	rent	for	premises	is	included	in	the	disclosure	for	
leases.	Regression	analysis	shows	a	strong	significance	level	of	0,00006 and	a	beta	value	
of	0.007,	which	 confirms	 the	hypothesis	 and	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 size	of	 the	 company	 can	
help	 to	 understand	 the	 deviation	 from	 correctly	 given	 leasing	 disclosures.	 The	
probability	of	 including	rent	of	premises	increases	the	larger	a	company	is.	This	result	
supports	 previous	 research	 done	 by	 Cooke	 (1989)	 that	 suggests	 that	 companies	 that	
grow	tend	to	disclosure	more	as	a	way	to	reduce	 information	asymmetry	between	the	
owner	 and	 the	 company’s’	 stakeholders.	 It	 also	 confirms	 previous	 research	 done	 by	
Glaum	et	al.	 (2012)	who	suggests	 that	since	 larger	companies	have	more	resources	 to	
spend	on	their	accounting	departments,	 it	allows	 for	a	provision	of	a	higher	quality	of	
accounting	i.e.	the	disclosure	requirements	in	K3.		
	
It	 is	worth	noting	that	the	significance	 level	 is	extremely	 low,	which	indicates	a	strong	
relationship.	However,	 this	may	be	 influenced	by	 the	high	standard	deviation	 for	 total	
assets	 that	was	presented	earlier.	This	was	caused	by	not	excluding	extreme	values	 in	
the	 data	 collection,	 which	 was	 a	 necessary	 decision	 to	 make	 in	 order	 to	 establish	
whether	 or	 not	 very	 big	 companies	 disclose	 rent	 for	 premises	 more	 often	 than	 very	
small	 companies.	 Also,	 variation	 in	 the	 data	 is	 hard	 to	 avoid	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 large	
numerical	 variables	 such	 as	 total	 assets.	 Thus,	 it	 makes	 it	 more	 difficult	 to	 without	
uncertainty	 draw	 conclusions	 from	 the	 relationship	 between	 disclosures	 of	 rent	 for	
premises	and	total	assets.		
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4.3.2 Debt‐to‐equity Ratio  
	
The	 second	 hypothesis	 states	 that	 excluding	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 for	
leases	can	be	explained	by	the	company’s	debt‐to‐equity	ratio.	The	regression	analysis	
shows	 a	 significance	 level	 of	 0.082,	 which	 is	 under	 our	 tolerance	 level	 and	 thus	 not	
rejected.	The	beta	value	is	negative	(‐0.027)	which	indicates	that	the	lower	the	debt‐to‐
equity	 ratio	 is	 the	higher	 the	probability	 is	 that	 the	 company	actually	 include	 rent	 for	
premises.	 This	 result	 differs	 from	 earlier	 research	 done	 by	Watson	 et	 al.	 (2002)	who	
claims	that	companies	who	are	heavily	indebted	will	provide	more	information	in	their	
annual	reports	 in	order	to	reduce	the	agency	costs,	which	in	accordance	to	Jensen	and	
Meckling	(1976)	increases	as	the	debt‐to‐equity	increases.		
 
4.3.3 Part of a Group  
	
The	third	hypothesis	assumes	that	the	companies	that	are	part	of	a	group	have	a	greater	
tendency	 to	 include	rent	 for	premises	 in	 the	disclosure	of	 leases.	This	 is	confirmed	by	
the	regression	analysis	that	demonstrates	a	level	of	significance	of	the	0.004,	and	a	beta	
value	of	1.629.	No	prior	research	that	tested	this	direct	relationship	could	be	found	and	
there	we	cannot	compare	our	results	with	previous	research.	However,	it	confirms	our	
initial	expectation	 that	companies	 that	have	more	stakeholders	are	more	pressured	 to	
disclosure	more	information	since,	as	Hill	&	Jones	(1992)	stated,	companies	have	equal	
oligations	 towards	 all	 stakeholders.	 In	 this	 case,	 if	 a	 company	 is	 part	 of	 a	 group	 it	
automatically	 increases	 its	 stakeholders	 and	 is	 expected	 to	 satisfy	more	 stakeholders’	
need	of	information.		
	
4.3.4 Big four audit firms  
	
The	last	hypothesis	states	that	companies	that	are	audited	by	an	audit	firm	from	the	big	
four	are	more	likely	to	include	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	for	and	thus	rightfully	
comply	with	K3.	The	 regression	analysis	 shows	a	 significance	 level	of	0.03	and	a	beta	
value	of	0.872,	which	confirms	the	hypothesis.	As	DeAngelo	(1981)	stated	in	her	study,	
hiring	a	big	four	firm	may	be	of	great	importance	for	some	of	the	companies	as	users	of	
financial	 information	require	reliable	 information	and	our	study	shows	 that	having	an	
auditor	 from	 a	 big	 four	 firm	 indicates	 that	 the	 required	 reliability	 of	 financial	
information	is	achieved	through	the	inclusion	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosures	of	
leases.	 The	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 what	 we	 originally	 assumed	 and	 are	 also	
consistent	 with	 previous	 research	 by	 Collin	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 and	 O’Keefe	 and	 Westort	
(1992),	which	 states	 that	 if	 a	 company	 is	 audited	by	 a	 large	 and	well‐known	auditing	
firm,	it	will	display	more	information	in	its	annual	reports.	
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5. Conclusions, Discussion and Further research 
	
The	 following	chapter	will	present	 the	conclusions	 that	we	have	drawn	and	a	discussion	
will	take	place.	Finally,	a	suggestion	for	future	research	will	be	provided.			
	
5.1 Conclusions and Discussion  
	
The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	to	what	extent	companies	who	comply	with	K3	
achieve	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 leasing	disclosure,	 as	well	 as	 creating	 hypotheses	 of	
possible	factors	that	have	an	impact	on	whether	or	not	disclosure	requirements	are	met.	
The	hypotheses	and	variables	that	were	created	was:	company	size,	the	choice	of	audit	
firm,	debt‐to‐equity	and	if	the	company	is	part	of	a	group.	Thus,	we	have	in	this	thesis	
analyzed	 if	 these	 variables	 can	 explain	 the	 degree	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 disclosure	
requirements	for	leases	regarding	rent	for	premises.	The	research	showed	that	56	out	of	
178	companies	did	not	 include	rent	 for	premises	 in	 the	disclosure	of	 leases.	However,	
the	 original	 collection	 of	 data	 included	 200	 companies,	 but	 since	 22	 of	 them	 did	 not	
specify	the	items	in	the	disclosure	of	leases,	we	could	not	establish	with	certainty	as	to	
whether	rent	for	premises	was	included	or	not.		
	
Our	first	hypothesis	is	based	on	previous	research	done	by	Collin	et	al.	(2008),	DeAngelo	
(1981)	 and	 O´Keefe	 and	 Westort	 (1992).	 Out	 of	 our	 total	 sample	 there	 were	 122	
companies	that	included	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases	in	accordance	with	
the	 K3	 regulatory	 framework.	 We	 have	 chosen	 to	 compile	 the	 Big	 Four	 and	 then	
compare	them	to	other	firms.	Of	the	122	companies	that	reported	complete	information;	
92	were	audited	by	either	KPMG,	EY,	PwC	or	Deloitte,	30	were	audited	by	other	auditing	
firms.	Out	of	the	56	companies	that	did	not	include	rent	for	premises,	27	had	hired	one	
of	the	big	four	firms	and	the	rest,	29	companies,	was	audited	by	others.	As	we	can	see	
the	vast	majority	of	the	companies	are	audited	by	one	of	the	big	four.	
	
When	we	 tested	 the	 hypothesis,	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 showed	 a	 positive	 correlation	
between	 choosing	 one	 of	 the	 four	 largest	 audit	 firms	 and	 the	 including	 of	 rent	 for	
premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	This	means	that	if	a	company	chooses	one	of	the	big	
four,	there	is	a	greater	probability	that	the	rent	will	be	included	in	the	lease	disclosures.		
	
Our	second	hypothesis	was	created	out	of	the	agent	theory.	The	agent	theory	focuses	on	
the	relationship	between	the	agent	and	the	principal.	Sometimes	there	is	an	imbalance	
between	these	that	is	often	based	on	information	asymmetry,	which	in	turn	creates	so‐
called	 agency	 costs.	 As	 the	 company	 grows,	 the	 agency	 costs	 also	 increase	 as	 a	
consequence	of	a	more	uncertain	 relationship	between	 the	agent	and	 the	principal.	 In	
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order	 to	 reduce	 these	 costs,	 the	 company	 tends	 to	 disclose	 more	 information	 in	 the	
financial	reports.	Thus,	in	accordance	with	the	agent	theory:	the	larger	the	company,	the	
more	 information	 it	 discloses.	 The	 study	 establishes	 that	 there	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 positive	
relationship	between	company	size	and	the	disclosure	of	 leases,	which	means	that	 the	
agent	theory	can	explain	the	degree	of	compliance	with	the	disclosure	requirements	for	
leases.	However,	the	significance	level	was	very	low	and	could	have	been	influenced	by	
the	high	standard	devation	 for	 total	assets.	 	The	relation	between	 total	assets	and	 the	
disclosures	 of	 rent	 for	 premises	 can	 therefore	 not	 be	 established	 without	 any	
uncertainty.	
	
Our	 third	 hypothesis	 is	 based	 on	 the	 stakeholder	 perspective	 and	 we	 tested	 this	
hypothesis	 to	 see	 if	 there	was	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 debt	 to	 equity	 ratio	 and	 the	
including	 of	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leases.	 Stakeholder	 perspective	
suggests	that	 if	a	company	has	a	high	debt	 level,	 then	the	stakeholders	will	 investigate	
the	company	more	closely.	For	example,	a	bank	may	examine	the	company	more	closely	
to	 ensure	 that	 the	 company	 does	 not	 violate	 the	 loan	 agreement.	 This	 can	 provide	
incentives	 for	 the	 company	 to	 report	 full	 details	 in	 its	 financial	 reports	 according	 to	
Watson	et	al.	(2002).	
	
The	hypothesis	test	showed	an	existing	correlation	between	debt‐to‐equity	ratio	and	the	
disclosure	 of	 rent	 for	 premises.	 Our	 results	 show	 that	 the	 less	 debt‐to‐equity	 ratio	 a	
company	 has,	 the	 more	 the	 likely	 the	 company	 will	 disclose	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	
accordance	with	K3	regulations.		
	
Our	 last	 hypothesis	 is	 also	 developed	 from	 the	 theory	 from	 the	 stakeholder’s	
perspective,	 which	 states	 that	 the	 company	 legitimacy	 is	 created	 through	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 company	 and	 its	 stakeholders	 and	 that	 the	 company	 has	
obligations	towards	all	stakeholders.	In	this	sense,	if	a	company	is	included	in	a	group,	it	
automatically	increases	the	amount	of	stakeholders	since	the	group’s	stakeholders	also	
become	 the	 company’s	 stakeholders.	 The	 obligation	 to	 provide	 information	 to	 the	
stakeholders	then	increases,	which	leads	us	to	the	hypothesis	that	if	a	company	is	part	of	
a	 group,	 it	 tends	 to	 include	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leases.	 The	 study	
establishes	that	there	is	in	fact	a	positive	relationship	between	the	variables,	therefore,	
the	 theory	of	 the	 stakeholder’s	perspective	can	explain	 the	degree	of	 compliance	with	
the	 disclosure	 requirements	 for	 leases	 regarding	 rent	 for	 premises.	 Out	 of	 the	 total	
companies	 of	 178,	 156	 companies	were	 part	 of	 a	 group	 and	 22	were	 not.	 115	 of	 the	
companies	 that	 were	 part	 of	 a	 group	 included	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	
leases	wheras	41	did	not.	Seven	companies	that	were	not	part	of	a	group	included	rent	
for	premises,	whereas	15	did	not.	However,	we	cannot	compare	our	result	with	previous	
studies	 since	 we	 could	 not	 find	 a	 previous	 study	 that	 tests	 the	 relationship	 between	
being	a	part	of	group	and	the	compliance	with	disclosure	requirements.	
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All	of	our	independent	variables	in	the	hypothesis	test	showed	a	significance	level	under	
0.1,	which	in	other	words	satisfies	our	qualification	of	a	lower	limit.	However,	we	hoped	
for	 a	 higher	 coefficient	 of	multiple	 determination	 than	 42.7	%	which	means	 that	 our	
independent	variables	can	only	explain	the	degree	of	 including	of	rent	 for	premises	to	
42.7	%.	
	
It	 was	 curious	 to	 learn	 that	 such	 a	 large	 number	 of	 the	 observed	 companies	 do	 not	
include	 rent	 for	 premises	 in	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leases	 even	 though	 it	 is	 required	 in	 K3	
regulation.	 Neither	 materiality	 nor	 the	 balance	 between	 cost	 and	 benefit	 can	 justify	
omitting	the	rent	of	premises	from	the	disclosure	of	leases,	which	means	that	we	should	
expect	a	much	higher	compliance	with	the	disclosure	requirements.	However,	to	follow	
the	 disclosure	 requirements	 in	 practice	 is	 not	 as	 natural	 as	 it	 should	 be,	 which	 is	
something	that	Verriest	et	al.	(2013),	Amiraslani	et	al.	(2013)	have	established	based	on	
their	studies	on	the	IFRS	level.	During	our	study,	it	became	increasingly	evident	that	the	
same	phenomenon	also	exists	in	Sweden.	It	is	worth	noting	that	K3	is	relatively	new	for	
companies	and‐	unlike	previous	standards	‐	now	include	rental	of	premises.	Only	time	
and	 further	 research	 can	 answer	 whether	 or	 not	 companies	 will	 eventually	 include	
rental	of	premises.				
	
We	 hope	 that	 we	 have	 made	 a	 contribution	 through	 our	 research	 and	 that	 similar	
studies	 will	 be	 done	 to	 establish	 whether	 or	 not	 companies	 will	 include	 rent	 for	
premises	in	the	disclosure	for	leases	in	the	future.		
	
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research  
	
The	 study	 conducted	 in	 this	 thesis	 determined	 a	 couple	 of	 factors	 that	 contribute	 to	
companies’	choice	of	not	including	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosures	of	leases	and	to	
which	we	have	 established	 a	 pattern.	As	 this	 only	 shows	 a	 pattern	 and	might	 contain	
elements	of	coincidence,	it	would	be	interesting	to	do	a	study	in	which	interviews	with	
the	companies	are	conducted	in	order	to	answer	the	question	why	and	if	our	results	can	
be	 confirmed.	 There	 may	 be	 more	 factors	 in	 play	 beside	 the	 ones	 presented	 in	 this	
thesis,	which	only	can	be	analyzed	through	interviews.	For	instance,	we	cannot	from	this	
study	 alone	 evaluate	 if	 the	 companies	 have	 made	 a	 materiality	 assessment	 that	 may	
underlay	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 in	 the	 disclosures	 or	 if	 the	 problem	 is	 with	 the	
knowledge	of	the	management.	
	
We	 also	 encourage	 creating	 more	 hypotheses	 and	 testing	 of	 even	 more	 independent	
variables	in	order	to	get	a	broader	picture	of	what	influences	this	phenomenon.	
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Appendices 
 
Office	rent:	1=Includement	of	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
Office	rent:	0=	Not	including	the	rent	for	premises	in	the	disclosure	of	leases.	
	
Total	assets	=	Milion	SEK	
	
Debt‐to‐equity	ratio	=	The	ratio	between	debt	and	equity	
	
Group:	1	=	Companies	that	are	part	of	a	group	
Group:	0	=	Companies	that	are	not	part	of	a	group	
	
Audit	firm:	1	=	Audited	by	one	of	the	Big	Four	
Audit	firm:	0	=	Audited	by	another	auditor	firm	than	the	Big	Four		
	
Appendix 1 – Companies Covered in the Study 
	
N  Company name  Office rent  Total 
assets 
Debt‐to‐
equity 
Group  Audit 
firm 
1  Hemköpskedjan Stockholm  1  754,471  4,13  1  1 
2  Intersport AB Mölndal  1  767,748  3,63  1  1 
3  XXL Sport och Vildmark AB Bromma  1  1236,745  22,92  1  1 
4  MMC Bilar Sverige AB  1  455,414  4,04  1  1 
5  Netto Marknad Sverige Falkenberg  1  2208,955  1,43  1  1 
6  Jula Sverige Skara  1  678,107  1,29  1  1 
7  NetOnNet Borås  1  681,167  2,1  1  0 
8  Admenta Sweden AB Stockholm  1  403,033  5,12  0  1 
9  Lindex Göteborg  1  795,259  57,82  1  1 
10  CDON Malmö  1  452,524  8,36  1  1 
11  Dressman Örebro  1  1298,519  0,7  1  1 
12  Electra Sweden Aktiebolag Kalmar  1  446,789  2,58  1  1 
13  Mediq Sverige AB Kungsbacka  1  366,577  2,13  1  1 
14  Ellos Borås  1  1333,364  0,64  1  1 
15  K‐rauta Kista  1  811,247  0,55  1  1 
16  Akademibokhandeln Stockholm  1  540,354  4,48  1  1 
17  L'Oréal Sverige AB  1  494,791  1,58  1  1 
18  Hornbach Byggmarknad Göteborg  1  286,685  7,89  1  1 
19  Plantagen Sverige Aktiebolag Hesta  1  328,873  55,5  1  1 
20  Siba Göteborg  1  782,568  1,38  1  0 
21  Synsam Drifts Stockholm  1  1110,713  0,63  1  1 
22  Arrow ECS Sweden AB Kista  1  444,559  6,17  1  1 
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23  Gymgrossisten Stockholm  1  200,99  6,15  1  1 
24  Cervera Stockholm  1  397,173  1,38  1  1 
25  CEDERROTH AB Väsby  1  1446,952  0,6  1  1 
26  JTI Sweden AB  1  897,811  0,42  1  1 
27  Nordic Room Improvement Holding AB  1  200,107  2,89  1  1 
28  Cubus Örebro  1  432,402  0,77  0  1 
29  Filippa K Stockholm  1  314,987  0,57  1  1 
30  Scorett Footwear  1  362,61  2,62  1  1 
31  Zara Stockholm  1  260,469  0,5  1  1 
32  Nya Stormarknaden i Kristinehamn AB  1  30,722  2,4  1  0 
33  Grolls AB Göteborg  1  393,545  1,16  1  1 
34  AFH Sweden Aktiebolag Solna  1  105,681  0,62  1  1 
35  Nille AB  1  81,123  4,65  1  1 
36  Nacka Stormarknad  1  73,19  1,82  0  1 
37  Luleå Stormarknad  1  199,02  0,18  1  1 
38  Gallerix AB  1  26,541  1,89  1  1 
39  Lager 157 Gällstad  1  305,493  0,6  1  0 
40  SverigesEnergi elförsäljning AB  1  299,525  59,61  1  1 
41  Ettfemsju Själ AB Gällstad  1  348,335  0,68  1  0 
42  Bro Möbler Kristinehamn  1  133,637  1,78  1  1 
43  Fiskars Sweden AB Stockholm  1  380,819  0,38  1  1 
44  Nordiska Bil AB  1  175,109  3,92  1  0 
45  GE Healthcare Sverige AB  1  403,68  0,86  1  1 
46  Carolinas Matkasse AB  1  109,227  1,06  1  1 
47  JC Sverige AB Stockholm  1  230,574  3,87  1  1 
48  BLS Industries AB Ystad  1  461,809  0,34  1  0 
49  Senab AB  1  204,605  3,56  1  1 
50  Kronhallen Butik AB Karlskoga  1  83,784  0,81  1  1 
51  Swedemount Sportswear & Fashion AB 
Grebbestad 
1  393,993  1,89  0  0 
52  Vagabond International Aktiebolag  1  302,411  0,25  1  1 
53  Rolf Ericson Bil i Dalarna AB  1  105,031  0,78  1  1 
54  Panduro Hobby AB Malmö  1  295,206  0,47  1  1 
55  Convectra AB Södertälje  1  42,034  2,73  1  0 
56  Mandum AB Södertälje  1  43,201  3,74  1  0 
57  Hedin Stockholm Bil AB  1  395,341  8,31  1  1 
58  Hööks Hästsport AB Borås  1  154,598  0,56  1  1 
59  TM Helsinborg AB  1  54,982  5,79  1  1 
60  Gallerix AB  1  26,541  1,89  1  1 
61  Dormy Golf & Fashion AB Örebro  1  102,492  0,87  1  1 
62  Risveden Invest AB  1  39,649  ‐50,75  1  1 
63  PoG Woody Bygghandel AB Lund  1  103,537  4,96  1  1 
64  Hunky Dory Holding AB  1  43,03  3,52  1  0 
65  Hi‐Fi Klubben Göteborg  1  61,782  1,5  1  1 
66  The Body Shop Sverige AB Stockholm  1  97,802  1,44  1  1 
67  Opus Equipment AB  1  65,301  0,91  1  1 
68  Spar Hotel Aktiebolag  1  208,714  0,03  0  1 
69  Gycom Group AB Stockholm  1  179,647  ‐5,73  1  1 
70  Synoptik Sweden Aktiebolag  1  268,324  0,65  1  1 
71  Copiax AB  1  190,433  2,27  1  1 
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72  FlexLink AB  1  945,3  1,04  1  1 
73  DAW Nordic AB Göteborg  1  127,721  0,79  1  1 
74  Skutan Livs Ab Åkersberga  1  85,611  0,58  1  0 
75  Papyrus Sverige AB  1  290,766  36,74  1  1 
76  Apoteksgruppen i Sverige AB 
Stockholm 
1  227,93  0,38  1  0 
77  Karlssons Varuhus i Sverige AB 
Göteborg 
1  63,429  1,84  1  1 
78  E. Svenssons i Lammhult AB  1  74,474  3,86  1  1 
79  Deichmann Sko AB Malmö  1  96,04  0,26  1  0 
80  Kontorab AB Norrköping  1  289,532  1  0  1 
81  Best of Brands i Stockholm AB  1  75,062  3,38  1  0 
82  Boxon Pak AB  1  199,018  5,78  1  0 
83  Lyko Retail AB Stockholm  1  113,966  2,1  1  1 
84  Junkyard AB  1  82,754  3,79  1  1 
85  Jollyroom Group Ab Göteborg  1  87,983  1,28  1  0 
86  Varbergs Trä AB  1  75,241  0,81  1  1 
87  Santex AB Halmstad  1  94,464  2,92  1  1 
88  Monocottura AB Helsingborg  1  95,036  0,35  1  0 
89  New Wave Sports AB  1  218,024  14,2  1  1 
90  Hans Anders Bygg AB Skurup  1  73,75  1,74  1  0 
91  OCAY Sverige II AB  1  134,524  1,68  1  1 
92  POC Sweden AB Stockholm  1  157,427  0,51  1  1 
93  NCAB Holding AB  1  402,162  3  1  1 
94  Aktiebolaget Blåkläder  1  628,293  1,42  1  1 
95  Rosengren i Kristianstad AB  1  75,746  1,04  1  1 
96  Luxottica Nordic AB  1  111,376  0,58  1  1 
97  AB Dogman  1  151,952  9,55  1  0 
98  Dell Aktiebolag  1  297,954  0,55  1  1 
99  TZ‐shops South Sweden AB Malmö  1  2,159  1,99  0  1 
100  Webhallen Sverige AB  1  342,608  3,64  1  0 
101  Pocket Shop Aktiebolag  1  67,457  1,77  1  1 
102  Music Retail Sweden Aktiebolag  1  148,919  2,37  1  0 
103  AB Stalands Möbler  1  102,736  1,25  1  0 
104  ÖoB Aktiebolag  1  1163,882  6,82  1  1 
105  Iduna AB  1  649,626  8,69  1  1 
106  Adlibris Aktiebolag  1  568,679  1,36  1  1 
107  Willab Garden AB  1  172,882  0,73  1  0 
108  ICA Sverige AB  1  14153,234  21,22  1  1 
109  OK Q8  1  10788,062  1,54  1  1 
110  OK Detaljhandel AB  1  278,584  30,06  1  0 
111  Volvo Bil i Göteborg AB  1  4431,02  4,39  1  1 
112  Fasetten AB  1  1834,961  6,96  1  1 
113  Vestas Northern Europé AB  1  1121,152  2,9  1  1 
114  Mondelez Sverige AB  1  2375,917  0,94  1  1 
115  Solar Sverige Aktiebolag  1  952,661  3,23  1  1 
116  Axfood Snabbgross AB  1  288,487  12,28  1  1 
117  Runsven Aktiebolag  1  519,695  9,19  1  0 
118  S‐Blommor i Stockholm  1  70,13  0,79  1  0 
119  Hugo Boss Scandinavia  1  95,567  1,35  1  1 
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120  Vida Wood AB  1  567,502  8,07  1  0 
121  Liljas Personbilar AB  1  333,978  1,86  1  0 
122  Citroen Sverige Aktieboalg  1  338,985  6,65  1  1 
123  Telgekraft  0  496,177  21,03  1  1 
124  Kjell & Co Elektronik AB Malmö  0  403,378  1,18  1  1 
125  Söderbyleden Stormarknad Söderby  0  115,067  0,89  1  1 
126  Tornby Stornarknad Linköping  0  64,758  2,09  1  1 
127  Jönköping Stormarknad  0  89,614  1,13  1  1 
128  Hälla Stormarknad Västerås  0  151,788  0,48  0  1 
129  Carlssons Livs i Helsingborg AB  0  82,717  6,49  1  0 
130  Grafiska Vägen Livs AB Göteborg  0  67,458  1,18  1  0 
131  Viasat Sales AB  0  6,811  67,03  1  1 
132  Traktören i Umeå AB  0  121,581  0,36  0  0 
133  TeknikMagasinet Sweden Aktiebolag  0  361,488  0,81  1  1 
134  Cumelin AB Alingsås  0  601,034  10,95  1  0 
135  Varuhuset Flygfyren AB Norrtälje  0  99,627  0,47  1  1 
136  InkClub AB  0  87,541  89,91  1  1 
137  Bessmanet Livs AB  0  70,868  1,41  0  0 
138  Plotagon AB  0  19,557  0,47  0  0 
139  AB Nymans Ur 1851 Stockholm  0  147,573  0,91  1  0 
140  Jagolix AB Landskrona  0  52,055  1,58  1  0 
141  River Island (Sweden) AB  0  51,265  ‐15,27  0  0 
142  Geidemarks Byggentreprenad 
Aktiebolag 
0  9,852  3,06  0  1 
143  P. Collains Göteborg  0  46,707  2,08  0  0 
144  Hedbacken Handel AB  0  43,548  8,88  0  1 
145  Ohlssons Stormarknad AB  0  40,53  0,22  0  1 
146  Stormarknaden i Jämtland AB 
Östersund 
0  46,583  2,35  0  0 
147  Dalarnas Stormarknad AB Borlänge  0  65,157  0,72  0  1 
148  Saigon City AB  0  14,317  41,19  1  0 
149  Yogiboost Retail AB  0  7,183  19,88  1  0 
150  Stormarknaden i Kumla AB Örebro  0  53,686  0,68  1  1 
151  Storbutiken i Sandviken AB  0  32,431  2,49  1  1 
152  Nyköping stormarknad AB  0  29,706  4,69  1  1 
153  Hugo Hendén Aktiebolag  0  77,322  5,63  0  1 
154  Ingaröhallen AB  0  10,723  0,84  0  0 
155  Silfverhjelm Livs AB  0  17,489  5,35  0  1 
156  Gränsen Livs Aktiebolag  0  10,05  0,98  0  1 
157  Bröderna Miller Aktiebolag  0  32,338  1,9  1  1 
158  Euro Sko Group Sverige AB Örebro  0  113,258  2,58  1  0 
159  Skånska Byggvaror Aktiebolag  0  127,422  1,03  1  1 
160  Högsbo Stormarknad AB  0  65,057  1,2  1  0 
161  Forsheda Livs Aktiebolag  0  53,341  1,28  1  1 
162  Bole Sverige AB  0  4,966  1,94  1  0 
163  Goldgun AB  0  30,4  2,04  1  1 
164  Rose & Born AB  0  20,796  2,3  1  0 
165  Nudie Jeans Retail AB  0  15,942  3,15  1  0 
166  MN Retail AB  0  14,939  293,12  1  0 
167  Family No: 1 House AB  0  23,996  ‐20,31  1  0 
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168  Hilfiger Stores Sweden  0  43,553  5,71  1  1 
169  Mango Sverige AB  0  29,357  0,32  1  0 
170  Airport Retail Sweden AB  0  36,803  9,12  1  0 
171  Synsam Sverige AB  0  689,019  0,92  1  1 
172  Socorocco AB  0  39,194  10,75  1  0 
173  Cykloteket Aktiebolag  0  32,013  9,6  1  0 
174  Vagabond R1 AB  0  28,833  3,3  1  1 
175  Kewije AB  0  42,802  1,03  1  0 
176  C & K Handels AB  0  33,223  ‐5,98  1  0 
177  SMC Stockholm Maskincentral 
Aktiebolag 
0  66,229  0,32  1  0 
178  Sneakersnstuff AB  0  37,932  2,58  1  0 
	
	
	
 
Appendix 2 – Example of How the Disclosure of Leases Should Look Like  
	
	
